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AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-MILITARY MOTIVATIONS 
FOR ARMS PRODUCTION 
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Naval Postgraduate School 
; Monterey, California 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 1989, Vol. 17 (Spring): 43-64 
The purpose of tflis paper is to attempt to integrate several strands of the 
literature on third world arms production/military expenditures and, in the 
process, demonstrate the manner in which these two elements are inter-
related. More specifically, we are interested in developing a framework that 
merges several elements of the Classical (high opportunity cost), Keynesian 
(source of employment and output), and Marxist (falling productivity of 
capital) approaches to the analysis of third world arms production/military 
expenditures. 
Using the resulting "Military Keynesianism" model, the main finding of 
the study was that the macro-linkages from the arms industry to the 
economy enable Third World arms producers to minimize most of the 
adverse impacts on the economy often associated with increased military 
burdens. The mechanism through which this process occurs, however, ap-
pears to worsen overall income distribution through the shifting of resources 
from wage goods to investment and durables. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the more disturbing trends in developing countries in recent years has 
been the rapid growth in defense spending. While the decade 1975-85 was 
marked by more than a thirty percent increase in world-wide defense spending in 
real terms, third world countries as a whole showed an even greater propensity to 
spend on armaments and security ~ an Increase of over 50 percent in defense 
spending during the same period. 
Despite this expansion in expenditures there has been very little investigation 
by development analysts of the causes of this phenomenon: 
The decisions with respect to military expenditures and arms imports were 
generally viewed as being governed by exogenous factors, outside the con-
siderations bearing on allocation of public resources for development and 
civilian government services, and presented as a kind of budgetary "Hob-
son's choice" (Deger and West, 1987 p. xii). 
Recently, however, the magnitude of budgetary allocations to national defense 
and the austerity imposed by severe constraints on the resources available to third 
world governments have stimulated a new interest in accounting for the purposes 
and consequences military expenditures. 
There is, however, little evidence as yet of a consensus with respect to the 
• 
appropriate weighing of factors in an explanation of the allocation of 
resources to national defense or in a generally applicable model of the in-
teractions between security and economic performance (Deger and West, 
1987, p. xii). 
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Finally, despite the heated debate over the presumed high opportunity cost 
associated with domestic production of armaments in Third World countries, 
remarkably little empirical attention has been devoted to the motivations underly-
ing the decision to produce armaments in the third world. The literature is in-
creasing rapidly, with a number of relatively recent studies (Vayrynen, 1983; 
Katz, 1984, 1986; Brzoska and Ohlson, 1986; Evans, 1986; Deger and Sen, 
1985; Wulf, 1985 Tuomi and Vayrynen, 1982; Wulfetal, 1980; Harkavy, 1975; 
and Peleg, 1980) examining political and power relationships associated with 
Third World arms production. 
Few generalizations, however, come out of this work. Reading this literature, 
one gathers that sociological attitudes towards conflict, local circumstances, 
politics, personalities, and historical setting largely determine on a case by case 
basis whether or not a developing country will opt to produce some of its own 
armaments. 
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to integrate several strands of the 
literature on third world arms production/military expenditures, and in the pro-
cess demonstrate how these two elements are interrelated. More specifically, we 
are interested in developing a framework that merges several elements of the 
Classical (high opportunity cost), Keynesian (source of employment and output) , 
and Marxist (falling productivity of capital) approaches to the analysis of third 
world arms production/military expenditures. 
Hopefully, what is termed here a "Military Keynesian" framework, together 
with its empirical estimation, will provide insights not only to the likely economic 
impacts associated with third world military expenditures but, perhaps more im-
portantly, a partial understanding of the motivations underlying these expen-
ditures and their interrelationship with atms production. 
Does the production of armaments in the third world largely take place in cer-
tain structural environments? Does this production in conjunction with the 
military expenditures hinder or aid over-all economic growth, investment, and in-
dustrial output? Are three serious side effects in terms of inflation or falling pro-
ductivity? Is the distribution of income affected and, if so, in what manner? 
ENVIRONMENTS CONDUCIVE TO ARMS PRODUCTION 
As a first step, it is of some interest to determine whether and to what extent 
third world arms producers possess structural and/ or performance similarities. 
More specifically, is there a unique set of characteristics that distinguish Third 
World arms producers from non-producers? Stephanie Neuman (1984) has 
asked "why for example do some states produce arms while others do not?" 
Neuman is, in fact, one of the few researchers who has attempted to determine 
the critical characteristics that set Third World arms producers apart from those 
countries who have not developed a domestir; arms industry. 
Her general hypothesis and regression results indicate that (Neuman, 
1984:173): 
What emerges within the Third World from these data is a hierarchically-
shaped arms production system based largely on factors of scale. In each 
region, the largest defense producers are generally those countries with the 
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biggest militaries and GNPs which dwarf quantitatively, if not always 
qualitatively, the capabilities of their smaller, poorer neighbors. 
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Clearly, however, Neuman's results and conclusions apply only in a general 
sort of way, given numerous smaller countries - Ecuador, Peru, Chile and 
Dominican Republic, for example - whose arms industries would not be an-
ticipated in light of their small economic size and relatively limited level of military 
expenditures. 
The data set used for the analysis below contained a variety of economic, 
demographic, and political indicators for fifty four countries. Of these, twenty 
were classified as military producers by Neuman (1984) i.e., countries producing 
at least one major weapons system in the 1979-80 period (Table A 1) . 
Unfortunately data on civilian production levels, employment, and the like do 
not exist on a comparable basis for the third world arms producers. Therefore it is 
difficult to make more than a subjective assessment as to major and lessor pro-
ducers. Establishing a scale for the relative development of arms producers is im-
possible. 
One alternative is to use the simple dichotomy of arms and non-arms pro-
ducers (Looney, 1988). On this basis a number of significant structural dif-
ferences have been found to exist between the producing and non-producing 
countries (Looney and Frederiksen, 1986a) . These differences can be used to 
provide insights into how military expenditures affect each environment. 
To determine the extent to which structural similarities exist between producers 
and non-producers, several sets of variables were first examined to see if the 
mean values of these variables for each group of countries were markedly dif-
ferent and, if so, in what way. The variables selected were representative of broad 
structural, performance, and defense-related differences between developing 
countries: 
1. External balance of payments variables; 
2. External debt variables; 
3. Fiscal savings variables; 
4. Composition of gross domestic product variables; 
5. Defense variables; 
6. Performance variables; and 
7. Size variables. 
An examination of the means (Table 1) of the arms and non-arms producers 
indicates that: 
1. As noted by Neuman, arms producers do in fact tend to have larger 
geographic areas, higher gross domestic products, larger populations, 
armed forces, and military expenditure~. 
2. Interestingly enough, the arms and non-arms producers have nearly the 
same per capita incomes. 
3. Arms producers tend to have less export instability, a stronger growth in 
imports, a higher percentage of exports in GNP and, in recent years, a bet-
ter export performance. 
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4. The arms producers, due to their larger size, have undoubtedly ac-
cumulated higher volumes of external indebtedness, but lower overall debt 
burdens (in terms of debt as a percent of GNP) than the non-producers. 
5. The savings performance of the arms producers is distinctly superior to 
that of the non-producers. 
6. The arms producers, as might be expected, tend to have a much higher 
share of manufactures in GNP than the non-arms producers. 
TABLE 1 STRUCTURAL, PERFORMANCE AND DEFENSE EXPENDITURE DIFFERENCES: 
THIRD WORLD MILITARY/NON-MILITARY PRODUCERS 
(means) 
---------------------------------------------------------------Symbol /Variable Arms Non-
EXTERNAL/BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Resource balance 
Growth in imports 1960-70 
Growth in imports 1970-80 
Growth in exports 1960-70 
Growth in exports 1970-80 
Current account balance 
EXTERNAL DEBT 
Outstanding external debt 
Debt as share of GDP 
External borrowing commitment 
Net inflow public capital 
FISCAL/SAVINGS CY.GDP) 
Average national savings 
Average marginal savings 
Government consumption 
Gross domestic investment 
COMPOSITION OF GDP 
Share of agriculture 
Share of Manufacturing 




ME share of GNP 
ME per capita 
PERFORMANCE VARIABLES 
Export instability (1967/71) 
Growth GDP, 1960-70 
Growth GDP, 1970-80 
Gross international Reserves 
Per capita income 
SIZE VARIABLES 
Area 
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Data Sources: Economic data was taken from the World Bank, World 
Development Report, (New York: Oxford University Press, various 
issues. Military expenditure data was taken from the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditure• (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office), various issues. The classification of countries as arms 
and non arms producers is from: Stephanie Neuman, "International 
Stratification in Third World Military Industries," International 
Organization (Winter 1984), pp. 167-198. 
7. Although having larger armies and levels of military expenditures than 
their non-arms counterparts, the producing countries tend to devote less to 
defense as a share of GNP, or on a per capita basis. 
8. While the overall economic performances of the arms and the non-arms 
producers are fairly similar (with the arms producers experiencing higher 
overall rates of growth), the level of international reserves accumulated by 
the defense producers considerably otltweighed that of the non-arms 
producers. 
In short, the arms producers are larger, more open to external trade, have 
more external debt, higher savings, and had more dynamic import and export 
performances than the non-producing countries. 
Additional studies have shown that, in the case of Latin America, although size 
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and military expenditures were important in determining whether a country pro-
duced a major weapons system, the nature of arms production necessitated acer-
tain environment in order for the process to be pr,ofitable. 
Given the nature of the import substitution process in the industry, our 
results indicate that access to foreign exchange is a necessary condition for a 
country to become a producer (Looney and Freeriksen, 1986b). 
The relative importance of foreign exchange in affecting third world arms pro-
duction probably stems from the fact that Third World arms producers are not yet 
completely self-sufficient in either the technical or material inputs required for 
arms production. Instead, the establishment of an indigenous arms industry 
places high and continuous demands on a country's foreign exchange reserves 
(Brzoska, 1983). Terhal (1982) estimates that in the late 1960s, military claims 
on foreign exchange in India was nearly half of India's civil imports of machinery 
and equipment. 
Given the fact that few of the existing Third World arms producers are likely to 
develop completely integrated arms industries in the near future, we can expect 
relative access to foreign exchange to continue to play, at least in the foreseeable 
future, a major role in determining the patterns of arms production in this part of 
the world. 
The above findings are consistent with and reinforce those obtained by Ayres 
(1983) .in his analysis of the stages typically associated with domestic arms pro-
duction. The first several listed below are heavily foreign exchange intensive. 
A) Arms are imported, but are serviced and maintained domestically (Ayres, 
1983:814): 
B) A license to produce arms is acquired and production facilities are built re-
quiring huge technical and personnel assistance from the supplier. 
C) Production starts and, in the beginning, involves local assembly of imported 
sub-assemblies. 
D) The sub-assemblies are assembled locally from imported components and 
sometimes re-exported to the licenser. 
E) Components are manufactured locally from imported raw materials. 
F) Raw materials are produced locally. 
G. Complete, indigenous production including design, raw materials, and 
manufacture exists locally. 
Ayres (1983:814) notes, however, that even those LDCs such as, India which 
have been pursuing military self-sufficiency for many years have not reached 
stages F and G. 
While the above findings provide interesti~g insights and are suggestive as to 
conditions that ceteris paribus should facilitate arms production in the third world, 
they do not in and of themselves provide a framework for assessing the manner in 
which indigenous production of arms is likely to influence the impact of military 
expenditures on the economy as a whole. 
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LINKS TO MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
Unfortunately, even at the conceptual level, economic theory does not provide 
an unambiguous prediction of the net impact of an increase in military expen-
ditures (Taylor 1981). Classical theory, for example, would predict on the basis of 
resource allocation that increases in defense will decrease investment and/ or 
civilian consumption and, thus, reduce growth or welfare. 
Keynesian theory, on the other hand, implies that in the presence of inade-
quate effective demand, the operation of the income multiplier would result in an 
increase in national product. More specifically, Keynesians generally assume, at 
least in the case of the developed countries, that in situations of excess capacity, 
additional demand and output from expanded military expenditure will increase 
capacity utilization, thereby increasing the rate of profit and possibly accelerating 
investment (Treddenick, 1985). Clearly, whether Classical or Keynesian effects 
predominate will determine the net impact of defense expenditures on economic 
growth (Deger and Smith, 1985:49). 
Because of the concentration of defense plants in the developed countries, 
most economists have tacitly assumed that if Keynesian defense related effects 
are operative, their impacts would most likely be felt in these economies. The 
developing countries being more supply constrained and generally lacking in-
digenous defense industries would be more logical places to find the classical 
mechanisms operative. 
Perhaps for these same reasons, Marxists have also focused their analysis of 
the causes and consequences of military expenditures largely on the advanced 
countries: 
In sum, the historical record suggests that the prosperity of the United 
States economy has been closely linked to military expenditures for the past 
forty years. To the extent that the government has been successful in get-
ting the surplus absorbed it has had to rely largely on military spending to do 
so (Weisskopf, 1972:23). 
On the other hand, Marxists have a hard time explaining why, given the 
rdative capital intensive nature of defense industries, the rate of return on these 
activities does not fall over time (Gottheil, 1986). One way to get around the ap-
parent contradictions in Marxist analysis is to assume that capitalist governments 
purchase military production at negotiated prices. They tax civilian incomes and 
profit and redistribute the revenue in such a manner that the favored military pro-
ducers receive a disproportionately higher return on their investment. This ex-
planation is still somewhat unsatisfactory, however: 
Still, such a government intervention cannot overcome the decline in the 
average rate of profit. Rather than buttressing modern capitalism as con-
temporary Marxist economists would h~ve it, military production hastens 
the fall in the rate of profit and, therefore, can serve only to identify the in-
ternal contradictions Marx had forecast ( Gottheil 1986: 568) . 
Despite the potential fall in the rate of profit stemming from high-capital inten-
sive technologies associated with arms production, several recent studies 
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(Looney and Frederiksen, 1986b; Frederiksen and Looney, 1983), have in-
dicated that in a more dynamic context, more or less resource unconstrained 
developing countries have been able to obtain positive impacts on growth from 
increased levels of defense expenditures. The reverse is true for the more relative-
ly resource constrained countries. 
A partial explanation of this phenomenon may result from the manner in which 
the budgetary process varies between arms and non-arms producers. Does the 
mere possession of industrial capacity in arms industry affect the manner in which 
budgetary priorities and tradeoffs are decided? 
Recent analysis (Looney 1986a; Looney 1989) of sub-groupings of develop-
ing countries has provided some insight in the manner in which defense expen-
ditures tend to interact with socio-economic allocations (Looney 1986b). Using 
the dichotomy between arms producers and non-producers adopted here, 
significant differences have been found to occur in the manner in which expen-
ditures interact with non-defense budgetary categories. 
In general, non-producers tend to cut a disproportionate number of growth 
enhancing allocations (general economic expenditures, transport, communica-
tions, etc.) to accommodate expansion in the military share of the budget. On the 
other hand, social allocations (health, education, social security, etc) in this group 
of countries appear to be largely protected from budgetary cuts during times of in-
creased allocation to the military (Looney 1987b, 1988b). 
Apparantly, the mere possession of a domestic arms industry places con-
straints on the budgetary process in arms producing countries that are not present 
in non-arms producing countries: economic considerations along Keynesian lines 
apparantly effect allocations to economic activities in these countries to a degree 
not found in the non-producing nations.' 
In summing up, there are sufficient differences in the structural environments 
of arms producing and non-producing states, so as to possibly affect the manner 
in which military expenditures affect overall economic performance. One im-
plication of this phenomena is that military expenditures are less likely to decline 
(through preempting foreign exchange) in the arms producing countries. 
Budgetary patterns in the arms and non-arms producing countries appear to rein-
· force these results. 
Clearly for the arms producing countries these two effects mean that the usual 
guns verses butter dilemma may not be operative to nearly the extent it is in the 
non-producing countries. In any event, a logical case can be made based on the 
above that the economic constraints on military expenditures in the arms produc-
ing countries are likely to be somewhat less severe than in the case of the non-
producers. In addition the above discussion suggests that the "Military Keyne-
sianism" argument often used in the advanced countries to justify military expen-
ditures might be applicable to the arms produeing countries as well. 
A MILITARY KEYNESIANISM FRAMEWORK 
One of the major attractions of the military Keynesian approach to the analysis 
of the ramifications of third world military expenditures is that it provides a 
framework from which to examine the interaction between military expenditures 
and economic growth. Most studies of third world defense expenditures implicitly 
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assume that defense expenditures are undertaken exogenously - they are seen 
as a function of externally driven events that increase security needs. 
In contrast, the "Military Keynesianism" approach focuses on the demand 
generating aspect of military expenditures. In this regard higher military spending 
may have significant multiplier effects, particularly if concentrated on the acquisi-
tion of domestic equipment and supplies. It is also possible, with excess industrial 
capacity, that positive industrial linkages to the non-military private sector exist. It 
follows that the demand generation emanating from the military may, through in-
creased capacity utilization, expand output and thus increase the rate of return on 
capital, investment, and possibly growth (Deger and Smith 1985:50). 
The "Military Keynesianism" approach stresses the need to distinguish be-
tween the first order and second order effects of military spending. The im-
mediate direct impact of a rise in military spending is likely to be higher demand, 
production, and employment. These favorable effects, however, may be offset 
significantly by the indirect effects of military expenditures in reducing priate sav-
ings and investment which, will in turn, hurt longer run increases in productivity 
and growth. Therefore, both the direct an--1 indirect effects of these expenditures 
must be considered in a net assessment of their economic impact. At the risk of 
oversimplification, there are four r. ain perspectives that might affect this assess-
ment (Chan, 1985:415). The first, the "modernization" model, is most closely 
associated with Benoit (1973, 1972, 1978). Benoit acknowledged that military 
expenditures can have three unfavorable consequences: 
1. Income shift (increased military spending necessarily reduces the civilian 
domestic product), 
2. Military productivity effect (compared with the civilian sector, the govern-
ment sector is characterized by slower productivity increases), 
3. Investment effect (military spending crowds out civilian investment). 
However, given his finding of a positive relationship between the defense 
burden and economic growth in the third world, Benoit stressed some compen-
sating favorable factors: 
1. The military helps to introduce modern skills and attitudes, 
2. The military's capital expenditures (e.g., roads, bridges, airports) have alter-
native civilian uses and help to strengthen a country's economic infrastructure, 
3. Defense spending leads to mild inflation which, in turn, encourages fuller 
utilization of production facilities. In Benoit's view, these indirect positive ef-
fects of defense spending outweigh its direct or indirect negative effects on 
economic growth. 
Part of the problem in applying a Milita!'y Keynesian approach to third world 
defense issues stems from the fact that developing countries are far from 
homogenous - one would expect the impact of increased defense expenditures 
on the Brazilian economy to vary somewhat from that experienced in Chad. 
Similarly, countries with an indigenous arms industry (Looney and Frederiksen 
1986) should experience ceteris paribus somewhat different defense/income 
multipliers than those found in non producing nations (where ceteris paribus a 
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larger proportion of increased military expenditures is likely to wind up in im-
ported weapons) . 
How governments allocate expenditures can have a significant impact on the 
relative incomes of the middle- and high-income groups. A major middle-income 
group is made up of professionals and administrators employed by the public sec-
tor. By raising the salaries of these employees, the government can easily im-
prove the position of the middle class (Looney 1986). On the other hand, an in-
crease in purchases of military hardware would increase the relative incomes of 
influential middlemen and contractors. 
A recent study of Saudi Arabian public sector expenditures illustrates this 
phenomenon (Kavoussi, 1983:345-361). 
In the aftermath of the oil price increases of 1973, government expenditure 
clearly shifted from wage and salary payments to purchases of military 
goods and investment in machinery and construction. By 1979, the share 
of wages and salaries in total government expenditure has been reduced to 
one half of the 1973 level. In contrast, during the same period, the share of 
investment increased twenty percentage points to about one-half of all 
public sector outlays. Immediately after the oil price increased, the propor-
tion of government expenditure spent on military purchases in'treased from 
25 to 35 percent and remained at that level until 1977. The slowdown in 
the growth of military expenditures in 1978 caused a larger increase in the 
share of investment than in the share of wages and salaries. 
Due to the lack of reliable data on income distribution, we assume below that 
changes in the share of consumption in GDP are reflective of income distribu-
tional changes, i.e., since the lower incbme groups consume a large portion of 
their incomes, a reduction in the share of private consumption in gross domestic 
product is indicative of a deterioration in the distribution of income. 
In short, if the Military Keynesian approach toward third world military expen-
ditures is correct, we should expect significantly different patterns of growth and 
distribution associated with military expenditures in arms producing and non-
producing countries. 
Impact of Military Expenditures on Consumption and Investment. Without ex-
cess capacity, increased military expenditures will either reduce civilian consump-
tiuon or else capital formation and thus growth. 
A priori the impact of the military burden on private consumption after controll-
ing for savings, government revenues, and the resource balance (exports - im-
ports) could either be positive or negative. However, taxes and savings should 
reduce the share of private consumption in GDP, with larger deficits in the 
balance of payments facilitating increases in the share of consumption in GDP: 
PRB = f[AS(-), RBB(-), RTCRYB ( -), ME'l ( ?)]. 
Where: 
PRB = share of private consumption in GDP 1982. 
AS = average savings rate 1970-81. 
RBB = resource balance as a % of GDP in 1982. 
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RTCRYB = government revenues as a% of GDP 1982. 
GETYB = government expenditures as a% of GDP, 1982. 
MEY = per capita military expenditures, 1981. 
For the non-producers: 1 
(1) PRB = - 0.45 - 0.37 RBB - 0.39 RTCRYB 
(-2.30)(-4.01) (-2.35) 
r2 = 0. 768; F = 22.37 
For the producers: 1 
+ 0.62 MEY 
(3.98) 
(1) PRB = - 0. 71 - 0.15 RBB - 0.04 RTCRYB + 0.68 MEY 
(-5.46)(-1.31) (-1.22) (-4.31) 
r2 = 0. 773; F = 21.29 
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Therefore, an interesting pattern exists whereby the military burden appears to 
be associated with higher consumption in the non-arms producing countries. In 
sharp contrast, increases in the military burden appear to come at the expense of 
consumption in the arms producing nations. 
For non-producers these results are consistent with those of Weede (1986), 
who concluded that because the military teaches discipline and some other useful 
skills, it does contribute to human capital formation and ultimately to economic 
growth. As mass armies effect the balance of power between social classes for the 
benefit of the less privileged ones, high military participation ratios contribute to 
income equalization (and thus a higher share of consumption in GDP, since the 
propensity to consume is higher or lower income groups) . 
For producing countries, other factors may offset this pattern. In particular, the 
impact of military expenditures on investment appears critical. In fact, and in con-
trast to consumption, the impact of the military burden on the share of investment 
in GDP (GDIB) is reversed, i.e., the military burden is associated with increase 
levels of investment in the arms producing countries and decreased levels of in-
vestment in the non-producing countries. 
More specifically: 
Non-producers: 
(3) GDIB = 0.85 AS - 0.67 RBB + 0.43 GETYB - 0.49 MEY 
(6. 77) (-4.67) (4.44) (-3.66) 
r2 = 0.784; F = 21.19 
Producers: 
(4) GDIB = 0.95 AS - 0.76 RBB - 0.46 GETYB - 0.62 MEY 
(5.89) (-4.37) (-.1.44) (3.04) 
r2 = 0.801; F = 24.97 
1. The equations below were estimated by a two-stage least squares estimation procedure to 
reduce the bias in estimators. The coefficients are presented in standardized form so that their relative 
magnitudes of importance in affecting the dependent variable can be compared directly. There is no 
intercept for equations estimated with this procedure. The "t" statistic for significance appears below 
each of the independent variables. 
54 Journal of Political and Military Sociology 
Where: 
GDIB = the share of investment in GDP, 1982. 
GETYB = the share of government expenditure in GDP, 1981 
How can these differential impacts of the defense burden - increased invest-
ment and reduced consumption - associated with increased defense burdens in 
the arms producing countries and vice versa for non-producers, be explained? 
Interestingly enough, these results are consistent with those likely to be found 
as a result of economic disarticulation (Taylor and Bacha, 1976). Particularly in 
the case of semi-industrialized LDCs, there is likely to be a group of dynamic 
leading industries specializing in production of automobiles, machinery, con-
sumer durables and military equipment. Higher arms spending selectively 
stimulates demand for products from these leading industries. The resulting in-
creases of output require employment of relatively skilled and managerial 
workers at high incomes; their "modern" tastes as consumers give rise to a se-
cond round of leading sector demand. If extra demand were met by diversion of 
capacity from industries producing commodities favored by less skilled workers 
and the poor, then the stage would be set for a growth process supported by a 
squeeze on wage goods. Investment would be stimulated by the increase in out-
put in leading sectors, adding still more demand pressure. There would be addi-
tional genertion of high-income consumer purchaser and so on. 
The whole process operates under a resource constraint, but it is evaded by 
diversion of capacity from sectors producing wage goods. In the process, only the 
poor lose by slow growth of production in commodities suited to their needs 
(Taylor, 1981: 4). 
The net effect might also be to lower the overall output to capital ratio, as 
observed above for the arms producers, due to the fact that wage goods tend to 
be more labor intensive than arms production or consumer durables. 
This sort of mechanism can support faster growth when there are significant dif-
ferences in consumption patterns between poor and rich, for example, in 
demands for food and consumer durables. 
The net effect in the arms producing countries would more likely be an increase 
(than in the case of non-producers) in investment (due to direct linkages) and 
declines in overall private consumption (since lower income groups consume a 
higher proportion of their incomes) associated with increases in the military 
burden. While the same investment and consumption patterns could conceivably 
occur in the arms producing countries, the likelihood is much less. In fact, these 
countries might experience a more direct, positive relationship between added 
personnel and consumption with increased military burdens and reduced levels 
of investment due to few direct linkages associated with an increased military 
burden. 
These are precisely the patterns for arms a~d non-arms producers indentified 
by the empirical analysis above. 
Inflationary Impacts of Military Expenditures. It is possible that the linkages be-
tween the defense burden and consumption observed for the arms producing 
countries could, instead of the mechanisms outlined above, be caused by infla-
tion and the resulting forced savings would impact on private consumption 
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(together with a stimulating impact on overall investment). 
According to this line of reasoning, one might also expect the inflationary im-
pact of increased defense expenditures to be greater for the arms producers (due 
to capacity constraints and policies of domestic absorption), whereas non-arms 
producers could, in part, meet added military burdens through constant price 
imports. 
In fact, a number of writers have argued that defense spending raises demand 
without increasing supply, and, therefore, does not contribute to current or future 
standards of living. Moreover, because more of this spending goes to the procure-
ment of capital goods than other forms of government spending, it is more infla-
tionary. It is also less resistant to price and wage increases since military procure-
ment from domestic suppliers is often negotiated on a cost-plus basis. Thus, 
defense spending may be disproportional and a cause of cost push inflation. 
Finally, because officials are usually reluctant either to raise taxes or to cut back 
other spending in order to finance additional defense expenditures, their resort to 
budget deficits and public debt tends to generate further inflationary pressure 
(Chan, 1985:418). 
According to this line of reasoning, the inflationary impacts of increased 
military budgets might be expected to be higher in the arms producing countries. 
To test for the inflationary impact of increased defense burdens, a simple 
model was developed whereby inflation between 1970 and 1982 (INFB) was 
postulated to be influenced positively by: 
(1) inflation in the 1960-70 period (INFA) - to control for chance high or 
low inflation countries. 
(2) the average military burden (MEYA) as a% of GDP 1970-82. 
(3) the average share of public consumption in GDP 1970-82 (PCB)l/2 
Public consumption was introduced to correct for any biases that might occur 
from high correlations between overall public sector consumption and the military 
burden, i.e., the higher the share of public consumption in GDP ceteris paribus 
the greater the aggregate consumption demand and the fewer the private sector 
consumer goods available to meet the demand. 
The results for the producing countries were: 
(5) INFB = 0.65 PCB + 0.83 INFA - 2.27 MEYA 
(3.18) (7.87) (-2.31) 
r2 = .869; F = 30.02 
The results for the producing countries were: 
(6) INFB = 0.22 PCB + 0.75 INFA - 2.37 MEYA 
(3.18) (7 .87) • (-2.31) 
r2 = .639; F = 16.27 
The negative impact on inflation of increased military burdens in producer 
countries is consistent with the "Military Keynesianism" thesis that governments 
increase military expenditures to offset downturns in the business cycle. More 
specifically, during economic downturns excess capacity develops in a wide spec-
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trum of industrial plants. If during these periods the government increases locally 
procured military equipment as a means of combating economic recession, out-
put could expand without creating economic recession, output could expand 
without creating inflationary pressures. In this circumstance we would see the 
result obtained for the producing countries (equation 5), but not non-producing 
cases (equation 6) whereby increased military burdens tend to occur during low 
inflationary periods. 
Apparently, non-producers lacking defense industries are constrained in using 
consumption PCB (equation 6) to offset economic fluctuations i.e., for these 
countries public consumption and inflation are inversely correlated. 
In short, there appears to be evidence supporting the argument that defense 
spending could encourage fuller utilization of existing productive facilities, and 
thus lending credence to the use of military expenditures as a tool for stabilization. 
In this context, defense expenditures have the potential of impacting positively on 
overall growth. While this argument may be particularly relevant for the arms pro-
ducers, it obviously has much less relevance for the non-producers. The latter 
countries are forced by necessity to search for alternative expenditure outlets for 
stabilization purposes. 
In this context, defense expenditures may be simply inflationary for some 
countries (although the military expenditures have a positive sign in equation 6, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant). For the non-producers, defense 
spending may simply impose additional burdens on the economy through ex-
panded salaries, etc., and producing excess demand for goods and services in 
general. The net result might well be slower, rather than faster, economic growth. 
Impact of Military Expenditures on Productivity. Military expenditures may 
have a more subtle effect on the economies of developing countries through their 
impact on absorptive capacity. If cooperating factors, such as technical person-
nel, infrastructure, vital intermediate imports, craft skills, and so forth are diverted 
to the military as a consequence of defense spending, then the productivity (or 
rate or return) of investment will drop. The result will be a reduction in the de-
mand for a new productive capital formation and a deceleration in overall 
economic growth. 
The counter-argument would claim that defense expenditure has a high-
productivity enhancement effect, since it contributes to skill formation, technical 
and vocational training, and the creation of new infrastructure (Deger and Sen, 
1985:50). In like fashion, skills imparted by military education and drill (knowing 
how to drive, functional numeracy and literacy, craft skills, etc.) remain with 
trainees for life. If soldiers are mostly conscripts, they may rapidly carry their ac-
quired learning back to productive use in civilian life. 
Regardless of which mechanism predominates, the net impact of increased 
military burden on the productivity of capital should (Lim, 1978) manifest itself in 
changes in the output capital ratio (ICOR) (here defined as the growth in real 
GDP 1979-82) divided by the growth in domestic capital formation over the same 
period). 
If the net effect of an increase in the military burden is to reduce the productivity 
of capital (and presumably its rate of return) increased defense expenditures 
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should have a negative sign when regressed on ICOR. Several other factors 
could, however, simultaneously reduced overall productivity and must therefore 
be controlled for. These include: 
1. The growth in public sector consumption (PCGB) i.e., an expansion in 
"unproductive" public sector consumption might divert resources from pro-
ductive capital formation. 
2. Inflation (INFB) might also reduce capital productivity and/ or absorption 
through diversion of investment towards more speculative activity. 
The model used to test for possible productivity effects of military expenditures 
was therefore specified as: 
ICOR = f[PCGB(-), INFB (-), MEYA {-)] 
Where: 
ICOR = the growth in real Gross Domestic Product over the 1970-82 
period divided in real GDP during the same period. 
PCGB = the growth in real public consumption, 1970-82. 
INFB = the rate of inflation 1970-82. 
MEYA = the average military expenditure per capita, 1970-81). 
The results for arms producers: 
(9) ICOR = 0.17 PCGB + 0.44 INFB - 0.84 MEYA 
(-1.05) (3.13) (-6. 97) 
r2 :=' 0.808; F = 20.73 
For the non-producers: 
(10) ICOR = 0.23 PCGB - 0.26 INFB - 0.10 MEYA 
(1.31) (-1.52) (-0.66) 
r2 = 0.127; F = 1.71 
The results for the arms producers indicate that increased military burdens 
have a highly significant and negative impact on the productivity of investment. 
The non-arms producers, in sharp contrast, do not experience any statistically 
significant impacts of military expenditure in investment productivity. In sum, the 
empirical results tend to confirm one of the hypothesis outlined earlier: increased 
military expenditures in countries with an indigenous arms industry may result in 
that industry (due to government priorities on defense and defense related ac-
tivities) preempting scarce managerial, scientific and technical inputs from the 
private sector, the net result being a reduced rate of return on overall productivity 
of investment. 
• The Impact of Military Expenditures on Overall Growth. The analysis in the 
previous sections suggested several mechanisms through which increased 
military burdens may, depending on whether or not the country is an arms pro-
ducer, impact on the growth process. 
As shown above, arms producers are characterized by a shift in income from 
households to the public sector associated with increases in the military burden. 
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While this shift does not appear to be inflationary in and of itself, there is reason to 
believe the net impact on income distribution may be regressive. In sharp con-
trast, non-arms producers appear to shift resources toward the private sector (in 
the form of increased consumption) as the military burden increases. 
A priori one can argue that the net impact of these income distributional shifts 
might be increased or decreased growth. A logical case could aiso be made that, 
given the many other factors impinging on Third World growth rates, the overall 
impact of increased military burdens is likely to be insignificant. 
Operationally, the role of the military burden (MEY) in effecting overall growth 
in third world countries was examined by determining its impact on the margin 
after other growth inducing and inhibiting factors had been accounted for 
(Benoit, 1978). 
GDPGB = f[GDIB(+), INFB (-), RBB (+), MEYA (?)] 
Where: 
GDPGB = the average growth of real GDP, 1972-82. 
GDIB = the average share of investment in GDP, 1970-82. 
INFB = the rate of inflation 1970-82. 
RBB = the average resource balance as a % of GDP 1970-82. 
MEYA = average share of military expenditures in GNP, 1979-82. 
The results for arms producing countries: 
((11) GDPGB = 0.79 GDIB - 0.21 INFB + 0.42 RBB + 0.39 MEYA 
(4.12) (-1.47) (2.68) (2.18) 
r2 = 0 753; F = 12.39 
The non-producers: 
((12) GDPGB = 0.95 GDIB - 0.27 INFB + 0.04 RBB - 0.64 MEYA 
(7.31) (-2.13) (0.47) (-4.59) 
r2 = 0.663; F = 21. 93 
Again, a contrasting pattern appears whereby the military burden tends to in-
hibit growth in the non-producing countries and stimulate it in the producing 
countries. 
The Impact of Military Expenditures on Industrial Output. The direct "Military 
Keynesianism" effect was examined through the dterminants of the growth in in-
dustrial output. It is assumed that as a result of the linkages associated with local 
orders for armaments, arms producing governments will have a relatively 
stronger military expenditure multipliers at their disposal - ceteris paribus a 
larger proportion of military expenditure in non-producing countries will go into 
imports. As a result, military expenditures in arms producing countries should 
have a greater impact on industrial output than in non-producing countries. 
The share of government expenditures in GNP is added to the regression 
equation as a control variable, i.e., to assure that any apparent correlation be-
tween military expenditure and industrial growth is not simply the result of 
military expenditure being correlated with government expenditure which in turn 
is correlated with industrial growth. The expected sign for this term could be 
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positive or negative depending on whether the demand effects associated with 
public expenditures are greater or less than its "crowding out" of private sector 
demand - higher government expenditures may compete for investment funds 
earmarked for capital formation in industrial activity or be associated with higher 
tax rates which reduce private demand for manufactured goods. 
Another control variable, the growth in real Gross Domestic Product, was also 
added to the regression equation - industrial output utilization should expand 
with the overall increase in economic activity. Since the military share of GDP 
may also expand during prosperous periods, OPEC countries being a good ex-
ample, the introduction of GDP growth should also eliminate the possibility of 
spurious correlation from this source. 
In terms of expected signs: 
!GB = [GDIB( +), GETYB (?), GDPGB ( +), MEYA ( +), producers (-) 
non-producers]. 
Where: 
!GB = the growth of real industrial output, 1970-82. 
GETYB = the average share of government expenditure in GNP, 
1970-81. 
GDPGB = the growth of real GDP, 1970-82. 
GDIB = the average share of investment in GDP 1970-82. 
MEY A = average share of military expenditures in GNP, 1970-82. 
The results for the producers: 
(11) !GB = 0.57 GDIB - 0.33 GETYB + 0.08 GDPGB 
(2.97) (-2. 75) (0.21) 
r2 = 0.857; F = 33.81 
The Non-producers: 
+ 0.30 MEYA 
(2.46) 
(12) !GB = 0.76 GDIB - 0.47 GETYB + 0.27 GDPGB - 0.42 MEYA 
(3.15) (-3.01) (2.57) (2.91) 
r2 = 0.912; F = 44.72 
Arms producing countries do in fact appear to obtain a positive linkage be-
tween their defense burden and industrial output. This effect occurs over and 
above that produced by total government expenditures (GETYB) and the over-
all expansion of the economy (GDPGB). In fact, the defense expenditure term is 
considerably stronger than that of the overall rate of GDP. This may indicate that 
industrial output in arms producing countries is more responsive to specific public 
sector expenditures than to more general improvements in economic activity. 
Again non-producing countries follow a iOmewhat different pattern. Industrial 
output in these countries appears responsive to the overall increase in economic 
activity, but military expenditures appear to either "crowd out" resources from in-
dustrial use, or, as is the case with general government expenditures, depress 
private sector demand for manufactured goods. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The present study has shown that a Keynesian approach to the defense growth 
debate provides a useful framework for extending Benoit's seminal work. In addi-
tion, this approach provides useful insights into the interaction between defense 
production and various economic aggregates. 
The orthodox view of indigenous Third World arms industries is that, as an 
economic strategy, the benefits of industrialization through armament are highly 
questionable: arms production is expensive in terms of domestic resource costs, 
especially scarce scientific and technical skills. It depends on extensive imports of 
components and technology with consequent reliance on arms manufacturers in 
the industrialized countries. Rapid obsolescence of technology and expensive 
high-risk product development make the returns uncertain. 
Much of the analysis underlying this conclusion is descriptive and anecdotal 
with little empirical analysis applied to the problem. The results presented here, 
while not necessarily contradicting the orthodox view, tend to place indigenous 
arms industry in a different light, i.e., it appears that the macro-linkages from the 
arms industry to the economy enable Third World arms producers to minimize 
most of the adverse impacts on the economy often associated with increased 
military burdens. The mechanism through which this process occurs, however, 
appears to worsen overall income distribution through the shifting of resources 
from wage goods to investment and durables. 
Several recent studies have examined the effects of military participation. Dix-
on and Moon (1987) concluded that military participation made a positive con-
tribution to welfare performance. In contrast, military spending appears to inhibit 
welfare outcomes, but this result was qbtained only when controlling for the size 
of the military establishment. 
Weede (1986) found that because the military teaches discipline and some 
other useful skills, it does contribute to human capital formation and, ultimately, 
to economic growth. As mass armies affect the balance of power between social 
classes for the benefit of the less privileged, high military participation ratios con-
tribute to income equalization. In an earlier study Weede (1983) had found that 
nations with higher skill levels, as indicated by school enrollment ratios, grew 
faster than others, and that nations with better social discipline, as indicated by 
military participation ratios, also grew faster than others. 
The results presented here, while looking at a somewhat different aspect of 
military expenditures, are in broad agreement with these findings. The results do 
suggest however, that the patterns found by Dixon and Moon may be reinforced 
in arms producing countries. However, the income equalization process found by 




"Arms Production as a Form of Import - Substituting Industrializa-
tion: The Turkish Case." World Development 11:813-823. 
&i Military Keynesianism in the Third World 
Ball, Nicole 






Princeton University Press. 
Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Lex-
ington, Mass: Lexington Books. 
"Growth and Defense in Developing Countries." Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 26: 271-80. 
1972 "Growth Effects of Defense Expenditures in Developing Coun-
tries." International Development Review 14:1-10. 
Brzoska, Michael 
1983 "The Military Related External Debt of Third World Countries," 
Jouranal of Peace Research 20:271-277. 
Brzoska, Michael and Thomas Ohlson 
1986 Arms Production in the Third World. Stockholm: Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute. 
Chan, Steve 
1985 "The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A 
Survey of Evidence and Problems." Orbis 29:403-434. 
Deger, Saad et and Somnath Sen 
1985 "Technology Transfer and Arms Production in Developing Coun-
tries." Industry and Development 15:1-18. 
Deger, Saadet and Robert West 
1987 Defense Security and Development. London: Frances Pinter. 
Dixon, William and Bruce Moon 
1987 "The Military Burden and Basic Human Needs." Journal of Con-
flict Resolution 30:660-684. 
Evans, Carol 
1986 "Reappraising Third World Arms Production." Survival, 99-118 
Frederiksen, P.C., and Robert E. Looney 
1982 "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries." Journal of Economic Development 7:113-125. 
Frederiksen, P.C., and Robert E. Looney 
1983 "Defense Spending and Economic Growth in Developing Coun-
tries." Armed Forces and Society 9:633-646. 
Frederiksen, P.C., and Robert E. Looney 
1985 "Another Look at the Defense Spending and Development 
Hypothesis." Defense Analysis 1:205-210. 
Gottheil, Fred 
"Marx versus Marxists on the Role of Military Production in Capitalist 
Economies." Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 8:563-573. 
Harkavy, Robert 
1975 The Arms Trade and International Systems. Cambride, Mass: 
Ballinger Publishing Co. 
62 Journal of Political and Military Sociology 
Katz, James 
1984 Arms Production in Developing Countries. Lexington, Mass: Lex-
ington Books. 
Katz, James 
1986 The Implications of Third World Militarization Lexington, Mass: 
Lexington Books. 
Kavoussi, Rostam 
1983 "Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Saudi Arabia." 
Arab Studies Quarterly 5:65-81. 
Lim, David 
1978 "Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Coun-
tries." Economic Development and Cultural Change 26:271-80. 
Looney, Robert E. 
1986a "Military Expenditures in Latin America: Budgetary Tradeoffs." 
Journal of Economic Development 11:69-104. 
Looney, Robert E. 
1986b "Austerity and Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: The 
Case of Venezuela." Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 
20:161-64. 
Looney, Robert E. 
1987b "The Impact of Defense Expenditures on the Saudi Arabian 
Private Sector." Journal of Arab Affairs, pp. 198-229. 
Looney, Robert E. 
1988a Third World Military Expenditures and Arms Production. London: 
Macmillan. · 
Looney, Robert E. 
1988b "Depressed Oil Revenues and Austerity: The Economics of 
Reduced Saudi Arabian Defense Expenditures." Arab Studies 
Quarterly 10:345-361. 
Looney, Robert E. 
1989 "The Economic Impact of Rent Seeking and Military Expenditures 
in the Third World." The American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 48:11-30. 
Looney, Robert E. and Frederiksen 
1986a "Profiles of Current Latin American Arms Producers." Interna-
tional Organization 40:745-752. 
Looney, Robert and P.C. Frederiksen, 
1986b "Defense Expenditures, External Public Debt, and Growth in 
Developing Countries." Journal of Peace Research 23:329-338. 
Maizels, Alfred and Machiko Nassanke 
1986 "The Determinants of Military Expenditures in Developing Coun-
tries." World Development 14:1125-1140. 
Neuman, Stephanie 
International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook, 1985. Philadelphia: Taylor and 
Francis. 
,, 
'': ~: ~~j-~i:~~:~-~~:::<··: 
Mtlitary Keynesianism in the Third World 63 
1984 "International Stratification of Third World Military Industries." In-
ternational Organization 38: 167-198. 
Peleg, Ilan 
1980 "Military Production in Third World Countries: A Political Study," 
in Patrick T. McGowan and Charles Keleg, eds., Threats, 
Weapons and Foreign Policy. Beverly Hills, California: Sage 
Publishers. 
Taylor, Lance 
1981 Military Economics in the Third World." MIT (mimeo, October 
1981). 
Taylor, Lance and Eduard Bacha 
1976 "The Unequalizing Spiral: A First Growth Model for Belinda." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 89: 197-218. 
Terhal, Peter 
1982 "Foreign Exchange Costs of the Indian Military, 1950-1972." 
Journal of Peace Research 20:255-259. 
Treddenick, John 
1981 "The Arms Race and Military Keynesianism." Candian Public 
Policy 5:77-92. 
Tuomi, Helena and R. Vayrynen 
1983 Militarization and Arms Production. New York: St. Martin's. 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
1987 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986. 
Vayrynen, R. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Controls and Disarma-
ment Agency. 
1983 "Semi-Peripheral Countries in the Global Ecnomic and Political 
Order," in H. Tuomi and R. Vayrynen, eds., Militarization and 
Arms Production. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Weede, Erich 
1986 "Rent Seeking, Military Participation, and Econimic Performance 
in LDCs." Journal of Conflict Resolution 30:291-314. 
Weede, Erich 
; 1983 "Military Parcipation Ratios, Human Capital Formation and 
Economic Growth: A Cross-National Analysis." Journal of 
Political and Military Sociology 11:11-20. 
Weisskopf, T. 
1972 "The Problem of Surplus Absorption." in R. Edwards, M. Reich 
and T. Weisskophg, eds., The Capitalist System (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ). 
Wilfetal, Herbert , 
1980 Transnational Transfers of Arms Production and Technology. 
World Bank 
Hamburg: University of Hamburg Institut fur Friedensforschung 
and Sicherheitspolitik. 
1985 World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. 
